Research
My research interests are in American political institutions, particularly judicial selection and the separation of powers. In my work, I look to answer questions about (1) the dynamics that influence federal confirmations, (2) how the public thinks about judicial nominees and judicial elections, and (3) how courts impact the policy success of the executive and legislative branches. My dissertation project, For the Record: Venue and Communication Strategies in Lower Court Judicial Confirmations—funded by a Law and Science Dissertation Grant from the National Science Foundation—theorizes about strategic behavior and communication between senators and judicial nominees, particularly in the wake of the 2013 Senate rules change known as the “nuclear option.”
Judging Judicial Nominees
Abstract: What determines public support for judicial nominees? We argue that support for nominees is based on policy congruence, and a nominee’s candor at her confirmation hearing can assist citizens as they try to align their support for a nominee with their own policy preferences. When nominees are evasive, other cues, such as past practice experience and interest group statements, can help citizens align their policy preferences with their support for a nominee. Drawing on two nationally representative survey experiments, we demonstrate that, when nominees demur in their answers to abortion questioning, citizens’ policy preferences play only a small role in shaping support for a nominee. But, when a nominee is forthcoming about their views on abortion, citizens’ policy views are a strong predictor of their desire to have the nominee confirmed. In a conjoint experiment, we demonstrate that—particularly in the absence of forthcoming statements from nominees—interest group support can help citizens to calibrate their policy views with their support for a nominee. The results emphasize the importance of confirmation hearings, even when nominees are evasive, for shaping public support.
Recommended citation:
Herlihy, Morrgan T. and Michael J. Nelson. 2025. “Judging Judicial Nominees.” Political Research Quarterly.
Hidden in Plain Sight: Questions for the Record in the Lower Court Confirmation Process
Abstract: Senatorial scrutiny of federal judicial nominees has long centered on confirmation hearings as the focal point of the advice-and-consent process. Yet senators draw on multiple sources of information when evaluating nominees for lifetime appointments to the federal bench. Questions for the Record—written questions submitted after hearings conclude—are a common but understudied component of the Judiciary Committee’s vetting process. In this article, I analyze QFR usage for all Court of Appeals nominees from 2001 to 2022. I find that partisan dynamics strongly shape who submits them, while nominee controversy—though significant—plays a more modest role than prior research on confirmation hearings would predict. Moreover, QFR submissions have increased dramatically in recent Congresses, particularly in the post-nuclear Senate. These findings suggest that QFRs are not simply extensions of hearings, but serve distinct strategic functions—especially for partisans and in contexts where time constraints limit other forms of scrutiny.
Conditionally accepted, Journal of Law and Courts.
The Supreme Court as a National Policy Enabler
Abstract: Nearly seventy years after Dahl’s landmark (1957) paper, recent events have brought into sharp focus the propensity of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court to uphold actions taken by the ruling executive. That propensity is the central subject of our paper. We examine the votes of the justices in cases where the U.S., broadly construed, is a party, focusing on the extent to which justices are more likely to support (that is, rule in favor of) the executive branch as a function of partisan agreement between the justices and that regime. We uncover wide varia- tion in the justices’ general tendency to support executive claims, and significant variation in the extent to which that tendency varies across same-party vs. opposite-party executives. Con- sistent with other recent work in this vein, those variations also exhibit substantial systematic changes over time.